










First series of cross-border cost 
allocation decisions for projects 
of common interest: Main lessons 
learned




have	 recently	 received	 a	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	decision.	These	 deci-
sions	include	twelve	coordinated	decisions	by	national	regulatory	authorities	




case,	 the	 cost	 benefit	 analysis	 indicates	 that	 the	 costs	 clearly	 outweigh	 the	





cost	 allocation	 decisions	 complies	 with	 the	 TEN-E	 Regulation,	 ACER’s	
Recommendation,	 and	FSR’s	 recommendations.	We	 find	 that	 the	 expected	
improvement	in	cross-border	cost	allocation	decisions	is	ongoing,	but	the	gap	
between	practice	and	recommendations	remains.				
•	 To	reduce	 the	gap,	we	have	updated	our	recommendations	 into	six	 lessons	
learned:	 [1]	 revisit	 the	 significance	 threshold	 and	 the	 interaction	with	 the	
Connecting	Europe	Facility,	[2]	promote	the	good	practice	of	using	market	








ISSN 1977-3919 – ISBN 978-92-9084-245-3
DOI 10.2870/579216






investor	 and/or	 beneficiary.	The	 TEN-E	 Regulation2	 tries	 to	
accelerate	 the	 development	 of	 these	 important	 projects	 with	
several	 regulatory	measures,	 including	 a	 procedure	 whereby	
national	regulatory	authorities	have	to	agree	on	the	cost	alloca-
tion	of	 sufficiently	mature	projects	within	 six	months,	 and	 if	
they	cannot,	the	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regula-
tors	(ACER)	is	expected	to	decide	on	their	behalf.	









such	 a	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 decision:	 twelve	 coordi-
nated	decisions	by	national	regulatory	authorities,	one	decision	
by	ACER	because	 the	national	 regulatory	authorities	did	not	
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1. The first series of cross-border cost 
allocation decisions











of	 the	 investment	 cost	 (green	 color:	 “loser,	 compensation”).	
In	three	projects,	countries	have	agreed	to	a	cross-border	cost	




jects,	 and	 their	 respective	 cross-border	 cost	 allocation	 deci-
sions	based	on	publicly	available	information.	Note	that	most	
decisions	are	only	published	 in	native	 languages,	 so	possible	
errors	in	the	translation	or	interpretation	are	ours.
2. Lessons learned from the first series of 




2.1 To whom are costs to be allocated?
The	spirit	of	 the	TEN-E	Regulation	is	 to	 implement	the	ben-





[1] Significance threshold 
Five projects of common interest (i.e. PCI 4.2.1, PCI 4.2.2, PCI 
4.4.1, PCI 5.2 and PCI 5.3) refer to ACER’s significance threshold 
to justify their cross-border cost allocation decision. 
There are sound economic reasons to apply a significance 
threshold: significance is a proxy6 for certainty and it makes 
sense to allocate costs only to countries that will benefit with 
sufficient certainty; involving many small beneficiaries in a 
coordinated cross-border cost allocation decision can be overly 
complex from a transaction cost perspective.
In practice, we observe that the threshold is also used to argue 
for EU funding, especially in projects where the benefits are dis-
persed over many small beneficiaries. In principle this is a valid 
argument, but the (unintended) consequence is that it opens 
the door to many EU funding requests, while the funding that is 
currently available in the Connecting Europe Facility is relatively 
limited. This fund has also not been set-up to deal with the con-
sequences of this significance threshold.
Recommendation [1] Revisit the significance threshold and 
the interaction with the Connecting Europe Facility (or avoid 
that it is misused to justify an incomplete cross-border cost allo-
cation, see Recommendation [3])
2.2 What costs are to be allocated?
Following	 the	TEN-E	Regulation,	 the	 efficiently	 incurred	 costs	
of	projects	of	common	interest	shall	be	borne	by	those	Member	
States	to	which	the	project	provides	a	net	positive	impact,	insofar	
as	the	costs	are	not	covered	by	congestion rents or other reve-
nues.	Gas	projects	have	to	demonstrate	that	they	are	not	commer-
cially	viable	with	a	market	test,	whereas	electricity	projects	do	not.
[2] Commercial revenues 
In four projects of common interest (i.e. PCI 5.3, PCI 6.1.1, PCI 
8.2.4 and PCI 8.5) the commercial revenue of each project has 
been used to improve the cross-border cost allocation decision.
The projects require regulatory approval because they are com-
mercially non-viable, but that does not mean that they do not 
have a commercial value. Commercial revenues are simulated 
in the cost benefit analysis, which can be complemented by a 
market test, and then used in the coordinated decision of the 
involved regulators. This should become common practice for 
all projects.
Recommendation [2] Promote the good practice of using 
market tests to improve the cross-border cost allocation decision
6.	 Note	that	alternative	implementations	of	the	significance	threshold	might	
be	conceived:	e.g.	a	proxy	for	likelihood	based	on	statistical	methods.	






[3] Connecting Europe Facility
Seven projects (i.e. PCI 4.2.1, PCI 4.2.2, PCI 4.4.1, PCI 5.3, PCI 6.1.1, 
PCI 8.2.3 and PCI 8.2.4) have an incomplete cross-border cost allo-
cation decision because they rely on a request for funding from 
the Connecting Europe Facility, the result of which is still pending. 
The consequence is that the final decision is delayed and 
approximate because not all EU funding requests will be 
granted. This is unfortunate because the aim of the TEN-E Regu-
lation is to expedite projects that are strategically important for 
the EU energy and climate policy objectives. 
Recommendation [3] Require a complete cross-border cost 
allocation decision (considering the case with and without EU 
funding, and the case with and without commercial revenues)
2.3 How are costs to be allocated?




this	 minimum	 standard	 to	 improve	 the	 commitment	 of	 all	
involved	in	the	project.
[4] Minimum standard
Most projects apply the minimum standard (i.e. Figure 1: red and 
green), except for three projects (i.e. Figure 1: blue) in which the 
involved parties have agreed to go beyond this standard based 
on the cost benefit analysis. However, some concerns have 
been expressed about the quality of the ad-hoc method that 
has been used to analyze the first list of projects of common 
interest. For a discussion on the method, please refer to our pre-
vious work7 on cost-benefit analysis.
Recommendation [4] Continue to use the results of the cost-




tion	decisions	for	interacting projects should have extensive 
coordination.
[5] Coordination of strongly interacting projects
In three projects (i.e. PCI 6.1.1, PCI 8.2.3 and PCI 8.2.4), the 
interaction between projects has been acknowledged and 
considered in the corresponding cross-border cost allocation 
decisions. Based on the publicly available information, it is dif-
ficult to assess if all strongly interacting projects are covered. 
As suggested in our previous work on the topic, this informa-
tion should be provided by an improved cost benefit analysis 
method.
Recommendation [5] Continue coordinating cross-border 
cost allocation decisions for strongly interacting projects




There are four projects (i.e. Figure 1: green and blue) that have 
a cross-border cost allocation decision that includes compensa-
tion. As far as we know, these projects did not make this compen-
sation conditional to the delivery of the project on the expected 
commissioning date, which could have been considered. Also 
for the projects that do not include compensation, it could be 
opportune to formalize the commitment of the involved parties, 
especially with respect to the commissioning date.
Recommendation [6] Start including binding commitments 
in cross-border cost allocation decisions, especially with respect 
to the commissioning date
Annex: First thirteen cross-border cost 
allocation decisions
In	this	annex	to	the	policy	brief,	we	provide	a	description	for	










	 Keyaerts,	 N.,	 Glachant,	 J.M.,	 2014.	 Cost-benefit	 analysis	 for	 gas-infra-
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9 projects with “No loser, no compensation”
PCI 4.2.1 Latvian-Estonian electricity interconnector 
between Kilingi-Nömme and Riga (BEMIP electricity)
Project: The	 project	 comprises	 a	 210	 km	 cross-border	 line	
hosted	 by	 Estonia	 and	 Latvia	 and	 is	 complementary	 to	 an	










in	 the	 region	 and,	 lacking	 a	detailed	per-country	 cost-benefit	
analysis,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 these	 benefits	 are	 shared	 equally	




PCI 4.2.2 Estonian internal electricity line between Harku 
and Sindi (BEMIP electricity)
Project:	The	project	comprises	a	140	km	internal	line	in	Estonia.	
It	is	complementary	to	the	Latvia-Estonia	interconnector	(PCI	
4.2.1,	 discussed	 above).	The	 investment	 cost	 amounts	 to	 64	
million	euro.
Cost allocation:	Estonia	and	Latvia	agreed	to	allocate	16	mil-








PCI 4.4.1 Internal electricity line between Ventspils, Tume 
and Imanta (BEMIP electricity)
Project:	The	project	 comprises	an	 internal	 line	of	210	km	 in	
Latvia	with	an	investment	cost	of	127	million	euro.	
Cost allocation:	 Latvia	 has	 decided	 to	 include	 50%	 of	 the	
investment	cost	in	the	Latvian	transmission	tariffs.
Motivation:	 Latvia	 has	 a	 positive	 net	 benefit.	 Without	 a	
country-specific	 cost-benefit	 analysis,	 the	 net-benefits	 in	 the	
other	Member	States	 in	the	region	are	presumed	to	be	below	
the	10%	threshold,	and	therefore	these	Member	States	cannot	
be	 obliged	 to	 pay.	 Latvia	 counts	 on	 the	 Connecting	 Europe	
Facility	grants-for-works	to	cover	the	50%	financing	gap.
PCI 5.2 Gaslink twinning of the Southwest Scotland onshore 
system (NSI West Gas)
Project: The	 project	 comprises	 a	 50	 km	 reinforcement	 of	 a	






Motivation:	 Great	 Britain	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 no	 net	 loser.	
Northern	 Ireland	 argues	 that	 the	 extent	 of	 its	 benefits	 is	
uncertain	 and	 likely	 below	 the	 Agency’s	 recommended	 10%	
threshold.	For	this	reason,	 it	dismisses	the	project	promoter’s	
initial	 proposal	 for	 cost	 allocation	 that	 allocated	 12%	 of	 the	
investment	 cost	 to	 Northern	 Ireland.	 Ireland	 agrees	 that	 it	
captures	most	benefits	and	 that	 it	 should	 indeed	pay	 for	 this	
internal	project.	To	keep	the	expected	tariff	increase	for	Irish	
consumers	 at	 an	 acceptable	 level,	 Ireland	 argues	 that	 Con-
necting	Europe	Facility	grants	would	be	helpful.








Motivation:	There	 is	 no	 net	 loser	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 ben-
efits	are	 located	 in	 Ireland;	any	benefits	 for	Northern	 Ireland	
or	Great	 Britain	 are	 deemed	 insignificant	 following	 the	 10%	
threshold.	To	keep	the	tariff	increase	sustainable,	the	Irish	con-
tribution	 is	 limited	 to	7	million	euro	with	 the	 shortfall	 to	be	
covered	funding	from	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.	A	part	
of	 the	 commercial	 revenue	 of	 the	 Shannon	 LNG	 terminal	 is	
allocated	to	the	Shannon	gas	pipeline,	which	connects	the	ter-
minal	to	the	main	gas	system.
6 ■  FSR - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2015/01 ■ February 2015
PCI 5.7 Val-de-Saône gas pipeline (NSI West Gas)






Motivation: There	 is	 no	net	 loser	 and	 the	 benefits	 for	 Spain	
are	 very	uncertain,	 amounting	 to	millions	 in	 some	 scenarios	
and	zero	in	other	scenarios.	France	argues	that	the	tariff	impact	
of	 the	project	will	 be	 significant	 and	 the	Connecting	Europe	
Facility	grants-for-works	could	help	to	ease	the	impact.
PCI 5.10 Reverse flow interconnection on TENP pipeline in 
Germany (NSI West Gas)
Project:	The	 project	 comprises	 enabling	 reverse	 flow	 on	 the	
existing	TENP	gas	pipeline	for	the	German	segment	between	
Wallbach	and	Bocholtz.





PCI 5.12 Reverse flow interconnection on TENP pipeline to 
Eynatten interconnection point (NSI West Gas)
Project:	The	 project	 comprises	 enabling	 reverse	 flow	 on	 the	
existing	 TENP	 gas	 pipeline	 for	 the	 11km	 German	 segment	
towards	the	Eynatten	interconnection	point.
Cost allocation:	 Germany,	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands	




PCI 5.18 Reinforcement of the German network to Austria: 







One project with “Loser, compensation”
PCI 8.5 Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (BEMIP Gas)






Agency decision8:	ACER	set	 the	compensation	 for	Poland	at	
85.8	million	euro.	The	compensation	is	split	among	the	net	ben-









the	 benefits	 to	 be	 more	 than	 twice	 as	 high	 as	 the	 costs.	 As	
per	 Member	 State,	 however,	 the	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 shows	
that	Poland	is	a	net	cost	bearer	with	a	negative	net	benefit	of	
-226.7	million	 euro,	 while	 Lithuania,	 Latvia	 and	 Estonia	 are	
net	beneficiaries	with	their	respective	net	benefits	amounting	
to	 578.8	million	 euro,	 359.1	million	 euro	 and	 118.5	million	
euro.	According	 to	 the	market	 test,	Poland	expects	 to	 record	






Three projects with “No loser, compensation”
PCI 6.1.1 Poland-Czech Republic interconnection: Stork II 
(NSI West East)
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amounts	to	648	million	euro,	of	which	391	million	euro	is	an	
investment	 in	Poland	and	257	million	euro	an	 investment	 in	
Czech	Republic.	
Cost allocation:	 Poland	 and	Czech	Republic	 agreed	 to	 each	
pay	for	the	infrastructure	on	their	respective	territories	in	com-
bination	with	a	mechanism	of	mutual	revenue	guarantees	that	
will	 be	 effective	 for	 20	 years	upon	 the	 commissioning	of	 the	
project.	A	significant	share	of	30%	of	the	costs	is	allocated	to	
the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.





cated	 an	 interest	 in	 booking	 capacity,	 but	 only	 after	 existing	
long-term	contracts	have	expired.	
PCI 8.2.3 Klaipeda-Kiemenai pipeline (BEMIP Gas)









Motivation: Even	 though	 there	 is	no	net	 loser,	Latvia	argues	
that	 its	 net	 benefit	 –	 and	 synergies	with	 its	 domestic	 under-
ground	 gas	 storage	 project	 –	 justifies	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	
investment	costs	not	exceeding	1.9	million	euro	or	3%	of	invest-
ment	 cost.	The	allocation	of	 costs	 to	 the	Connecting	Europe	
Facility	is	argued	to	be	justified	by	pointing	out	the	significant	
tariff	impact	for	consumers	in	the	absence	of	grants-for-works.









cated	 to	 the	Connecting	Europe	Facility.	The	 remaining	part	








to	make	commercial	 revenues	which	can	be	used,	 in	part,	 to	
reduce	the	allocated	costs.
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